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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Allen contends the district court erred by denying his post-conviction petition
because the preponderance of the evidence showed his attorney had failed to file a viable motion
to suppress. The State's responses are based on unjustified attempts to distinguish the applicable
precedent, and adopting its positions would result in the impoundment exception swallowing the
Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Therefore, this
Court should reject those arguments and reverse the order denying Mr. Allen's petition for postconviction relief

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated m
Mr. Allen's Appellant's Brie£

They need not be repeated m this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Allen's petition for post-conviction relief
because the preponderance of the evidence showed his attorney was ineffective for not filing a
viable motion to suppress.

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Allen's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Because
The Preponderance Of The Evidence Showed His Attorney Was Ineffective For Not Filing A
Viable Motion To Suppress

A.

The Uncontroverted Evidence Before The District Court Established That, Had Trial
Counsel Filed The Motion To Suppress In This Case, It Would Not Have Failed For Lack
Of Standing
Where testimony is not contradicted, the following, well-established rule governs:
The rule applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of
an action, is, that either a board, court or jury must accept as true the positive,
uncontroverted testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently
improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or
trial. . . . [N]either the trial court nor a jury may arbitrarily and capriciously
disregard the testimony of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes known to
the law, if such testimony does not exceed probability.... Testimony which is
inherently improbable may be disregarded, * * * [sic] but to warrant such action
there must exist either a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its
falsity must be apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions.

Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 626-27 (1979) (internal quotations and citations omitted);
accord Hartgrave v. City of Twin Falls, 163 Idaho 347, 355-56 (2018) ("this Court has
repeatedly held that the uncontroverted testimony of a credible witness should not be
disregarded").
This rule demonstrates why the Court of Appeals' decision in Hoffman v. State, 153
Idaho 898 (Ct. App. 2012), despite the State's assertion to the contrary in a footnote, remains
relevant to this case. (See Resp. Br., p.11 n.4.) Hoffman articulated the legal principle which is
at issue when a post-conviction petition deals with whether an untiled motion to suppress would
fail for lack of standing - the petitioner has to show that he had permission to use the property
(in this case, as in Hoffman, permission to be driving the car) in order to show that he could have
proved he had standing. Hoffman, 153 Idaho at 904. Given the procedural stance of Hoffman,
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the petitioner’s burden in Hoffman was to establish a genuine issue of material fact. In meeting
that burden, the petitioner in Hoffman could rely on a presumption that his allegations of fact
were true even in the face of contradictory facts. See id. However, he still needed to actually
present allegations of fact to support his claims in order to meet his burden. While he could have
supported his claims with allegations of fact in affidavits from other people, the petitioner in
Hoffman chose to provide only his own affidavit instead. And yet, the Hoffman Court concluded
his lone allegations were sufficient to show he could establish standing.
While Mr. Allen may bear a heavier burden, and may not be entitled to be believed in the
face of contradictory facts, that does not make Hoffman irrelevant, either in terms of what the
legal principle is, or whether the evidence provided by the petitioner himself could, by itself,
satisfy that burden. In fact, the United States Supreme Court found precisely that – that the
defendant’s testimony that he had the apparent owner’s permission to use the property – was
sufficient to meet the defendant’s burden to prove he had standing to challenge the search of the
property. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). Because Mr. Allen’s uncontradicted testimony on
that point was capable of carrying that burden, the district court could not arbitrarily disregard it.
Dineen, 100 Idaho at 626-27.
In another footnote, the State suggests that Jones is irrelevant because the State believes
it dealt with a purely legal interpretation of F.R.C.P. 41(e). (Resp. Br., p.12 n.5.) The State cites
no authority to support that assertion. (See generally Resp. Br.) That is not actually surprising
since, as recently as last year, the United States Supreme Court has relied on Jones for the same
legal principle as Mr. Allen does now. Byrd v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1518,
1528 (2018) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978)) (“This situation would be
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similar to the defendant in Jones, supra, who, as Rakas notes, had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his friend's apartment because he "had complete dominion and control over the
apartment and could exclude others from it."' 1). Thus, the State's attempt to distinguish Jones
on this basis is frivolous.
That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Supreme Court has continued to rely on
Jones in this regard despite the fact that Rule 41 (e) has since been amended and no longer

contains the language upon which the State tries to rely to conjure its distinction. The prior
version of the rule provided that "a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" could
move for suppression on various grounds. Jones, 362 U.S. at 260-61 (quoting the applicable
version of Rule 41(e)). The new rule, now codified as Rule 41(h) does not contain the standing
requirement; rather, it simply provides that "[a] defendant may move to suppress evidence in the
court where the trial will occur as Rule 12 provides."2 F.R.C.P. 41(h). Thus, the fact that the
United States Supreme Court continues to rely on Jones' s standing analysis despite the fact that
the federal rule no longer requires a showing of standing reveals that Jones is not limited in the
way the State suggests.
Furthermore, Jones only discussed Rule 41 (e) with respect to the since-overruled concept
of inherent standing. See Jones, at 260-64. It did not mention the rule in its still-surviving
discussion of standing based on permission to use the apartment. Id. at 265-67 (deicing that
issue instead on its conclusion that property law concepts should not control the question of
standing). As such, the applicable portion of Jones was never tied to just Rule 41(e). Therefore,
the analysis in Jones remains applicable to this case. Under that analysis, Mr. Allen, like the

1

The only evidence of this fact came from the defendant's own testimony. See Jones, 362 U.S.
at 259.
2
Rule 12 simply requires that the defendant file such motions before trial. F.R.C.P. 12(b)(3)(C).
5

defendant in Jones, could show his standing to challenge the search of the property simply
through his testimony that he had the apparent owner’s permission to use it. Or, as the Idaho
Supreme Court has put it, the district court could not arbitrarily ignore his uncontroverted
testimony in that regard. Hartgrave, 163 Idaho at 355-56; Dinneen, 100 Idaho at 626-27.
However, by its own language, that is exactly what the district court did in this case – it
arbitrarily disregarded Mr. Allen’s testimony in its entirety based on its conclusion that he “did
not produce any viable evidence to prove” his allegations.

(R., p.74 (emphasis added).)

“Viable,” in this context, means “[c]apable of independent existence or standing <a viable
lawsuit>.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 760 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). Mr. Allen’s testimony – that
his boss gave Mr. Allen permission to drive the truck while he paid the boss back for buying it
from its original owner – is capable of independent existence, as demonstrated by the fact that
Hoffman and Jones found similar testimony to be sufficient to prove standing.
In attempting to justify the district court’s decision in this regard, the State confuses the
concept of “viability” with the concept of “credibility.” (See Resp. Br., pp.11-12 (arguing that
what the district court must have done was implicitly find Mr. Allen’s testimony in this regard to
be not credible). “Credibility” is simply “[t]he quality that makes something (as a witness or
some evidence) worthy of belief.”

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 164.

As such,

testimony can be both viable and not credible – it could be capable of standing on its own, but
ultimately fail to do so because it is found to be unbelievable. Thus, the district court’s assertion
that Mr. Allen’s testimony was not “viable” indicates that the district court did not consider his
testimony at all, not that it considered it and found it to be incredible, as the State now contends.
As such, the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Allen’s petition was inconsistent with the legal
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standards set forth in Jones, Hoffman, and Dinneen, in that it failed to conduct the analysis
required by arbitrarily refusing to consider Mr. Allen’s otherwise-uncontradicted testimony.
Even if the State is correct, and the district court had properly determined Mr. Allen’s
testimony was not credible, the State’s conclusion – that this means this Court should affirm the
denial of his petition (Resp. Br., pp.13-14) – is improper, as that argument ignores the fact that
the officer’s preliminary hearing testimony, which was also uncontroverted, was also presented
and supported Mr. Allen’s claim for relief. (App. Br., pp.10-11.) Specifically, the officer
testified he was actually acting based on his conclusion that Mr. Allen was in lawful possession
of the car as a potential buyer. (Tr., p.26, Ls.24-25.) In other words, the officer was testifying
that, even though the truck had fictitious plates, Mr. Allen was not clear as to who owned the
truck, he was not able to immediately remember his boss’s address or telephone number, and he
did not have documentation of the sale, the officer still concluded that Mr. Allen had possession
of the truck because he was intending to purchase it.

That this was the officer’s actual

conclusion is not inherently improbably, nor was it rendered so by the facts and circumstances,
and therefore, it cannot be arbitrarily ignored just because the State’s attorneys would reach a
different conclusion. Dineen, 100 Idaho at 626-27.
That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court has recently and
repeatedly reaffirmed that the officer’s expressed conclusions are relevant considerations within
the totality of the circumstances. State v. Albertson, ___ P.3d ___, 2019 WL 1397277, *6 n.8
(Mar. 28, 2019) (“We note that, although the test is an objective one, if an officer is actually
aware that a person has not acted to revoke the implied license, he would not be free to approach
the home.”), not yet final; State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 651 (2017) (holding that, even though,
objectively, there was probable cause for the officer to arrest the defendant for driving without
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privileges, the search of the defendant’s person was ultimately not justified as a search incident
to arrest because the officer actually did not intend to arrest the defendant, instead, telling the
defendant he would receive a citation).) Here, as in Lee, the State is attempting to justify the
search through a determination of objective reasonableness in hindsight by contradicting what
the officer actually did at the time of his actions, and that is improper. See also State v.
Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31 (2017) (holding that the appellate courts only evaluate such cases
based on what the officer actually did, not what he might have otherwise lawfully done).
In other words, the State’s argument on appeal is actually a perfect illustration of
arbitrarily disregarding the testimony of an unimpeached witness. As a result, if Mr. Allen’s
testimony was properly deemed not credible, the only other testimony presented during the
hearing which spoke as to whether Mr. Allen’s possession of the truck was lawful was the
officer’s preliminary hearing testimony. Since the officer’s testimony confirmed that the he was
acting from the perspective that Mr. Allen was in possession of the car as a prospective buyer,
the only credible evidence in the record made it more likely true that Mr. Allen was driving it
with the owner’s permission, and thus, that he was in lawful possession of the truck. Therefore,
that evidence was sufficient evidence to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
unfiled motion to suppress would not have failed for lack of standing. See Oxley v. Medicine
Rock Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 481 (2003) (defining the preponderance standard). As a
result, and the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Allen’s petition for failure to carry his burden
with respect to standing was erroneous.

8

B.

Mr. Allen Met His Burden To Prove The Motion To Suppress Would Likely Have Been
Successful Because The Officer's Decision To Impound The Truck In This Case Was
Objectively Unreasonable For Numerous Reasons
The State devotes much of its argument on the merits of the untiled motion to the idea

that, because the officer testified he was following his understanding of the office policy, his
actions were reasonable. (See, e.g., Resp. Br., pp.16-19.) That argument carries no weight if the
policy itself was objectively unreasonable - if a policy tells the officer to seize property in a
manner which is inappropriate under the Fourth Amendment, the officer's actions under that
policy will still violate the rights of the person from whom the property was seized. Thus, his
actions pursuant to an unreasonable policy would still be objectively unreasonable.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has actually held precisely that in the related context of
inventory searches. State v. Owen, 143 Idaho 274, 278 (Ct. App. 2006). In that case, the
testimony was that the officer believed he was following an unwritten policy to inventory
everything taken into police custody when he opened a locked safe. Id. at 277-78. The Court of
Appeals held that the search was objectively unreasonable because the verbal policy was
impermissibly vague, and so, failed to satisfy the overarching legal requirement that the officer's
discretion in conducting an inventory search be guided by standardized criteria. Id. (citing
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1990) (in which the United States Supreme Court found that

opening a locked container found in an impounded car was unconstitutional because the
department had no standards regarding such inventory searches)). 3 Thus, "[ a]ny suspicion the
officers had that the safe contained contraband did not alleviate the necessity for the sheriffs

3

The rule that Wells applied in the context of an inventory search came from Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), and South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). Wells, 495
U.S. at 3-4 (quoting Bertine's explanation of Opperman's rule). Bertine and Opperman are also
the cornerstone precedent which define what is required under the impoundment exception to the
warrant requirement. See State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 291 (1995).
9

department to either get a warrant or to establish, and its officers follow, a standardized criteria
for dealing with locked containers pursuant to the inventory search exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 278.
The rationale behind that rule is, as the Tenth Circuit has succinctly explained, applicable
to the impoundment exception as well: “Protection against unreasonable impoundments, even
those conducted pursuant to a standard policy, is part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241,
1250 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).

Were it otherwise, policymakers could simply

eliminate the constitutional protections “by requiring plainly unconstitutional searches of every
nook and cranny of a vehicle.” State v. Nordloh, 144 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Ct. App. Or. 2006). Of
course, legislative and executive orders cannot require the government to provide less protection
than what the United States Supreme Court has declared the Constitution to require. See State v.
Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2000) (reiterating that the United States Supreme Court sets the
constitutional floor). Therefore, an officer following a policy that authorizes an unreasonable
impoundment of the car has acted in an objectively-unreasonable manner under the Fourth
Amendment.
This conclusion – that an officer following an unreasonable policy is not acting in an
objectively reasonable manner – is reinforced by that fact that “the absence of a well-defined,
written policy establishing standardized criteria for inventory searches increases a department’s
exposure to liability.” Owen, 143 Idaho at 278. As the United States Supreme Court has
explained, it is precisely because the objectively-unreasonable policy causes the government’s
agent to violate a person’s constitutional rights that the government is civilly liable. Monell v.
Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (“[I]t is when execution of a government’s
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policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under
§ 1983.”); accord Lewis v. City of Topeka, 305 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1216 (D.Kan. 2004) (“A
municipality may only be held liable for a § 1983 claim if it has established a policy or custom
which causes the alleged injury.”).
The verbal policy upon which the State relies in Mr. Allen’s case – to impound every car
upon arrest – is the same sort of impermissibly vague and generic policy that the Court of
Appeals found to be objectively unreasonable in Owen.

It does not meet the overarching

requirement to establish standards to guide the officer’s exercise of discretion in the field, and so,
does not allow for objectively reasonable impoundments. See Owen, 143 Idaho at 278. For
example, that verbal policy the officer used in Mr. Allen’s case would require the officer to
impound a car regardless of whether a capable driver were on scene to remove the car, which is
problematic because the Idaho Supreme Court has held impoundment is not permissible in that
situation because it would not serve either of the historical justifications for the impoundment
exception. Weaver, 127 Idaho at 291-92. Therefore, the verbal policy upon which the officer
relied was objectively unreasonable, and as such, the officer’s actions under that policy were also
objectively unreasonable.
The Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868 (Ct. App. 2012), does
not, as the State believes, compel a different conclusion. (See Resp. Br., pp.17-18.) That is
because Stewart was dealing with an officer’s failure to comply with an established policy, not
with a question of whether the policy was itself unreasonable. Stewart, 152 Idaho at 872. If the
policy is reasonable (or not in question), the Fourth Amendment analysis should, indeed, turn on
whether what the officer actually did was objectively unreasonable. Owen, on the other hand,
explains that, when the policy is not reasonable, that impacts the determination of whether the
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officer's ensuing actions were reasonable.

Owen, 143 Idaho at 278.

Therefore, Owen, not

Stewart, represents the controlling law in this regard.

Even if Stewart did stand for the principle that an unreasonable policy does not make the
seizure under that policy objectively unreasonable, that would not fully resolve the question in
this case because Stewart still allows for the possibility that the search would still ultimately be
unreasonable within the totality of the circumstances presented by a particular case. See Stewart,
152 Idaho at 872 n.1 (noting that failure to comply with the policy does not make the search
"unreasonable per se") (emphasis added). Therefore, even under the State's rule, this Court
would need to assess the reasonableness of the officer's actions.
Here, the officer's actions were objectively unreasonable because the officer was not
simply relying on a verbal policy in a vacuum; he was relying on a verbal policy despite knowing
a written policy existed and willfully remaining ignorant of what the written policy requires.
(Tr., p.24, Ls.13-14, p.30, Ls.5-6.) The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that an
officer can gain no advantage under the Fourth Amendment, that it is objectively unreasonable
for him to act, with willful ignorance of the standard he is supposed to be enforcing. Heien v.
North Carolina,_ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014); cf State v. Pettite, 162 Idaho 849,

854-55 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding that even an officer's reasonable mistake oflaw will not render
his actions objectively reasonable under the State constitution's counterpart to the Fourth
Amendment).
Nevertheless, the State would have this Court join the minority of jurisdictions in the
current split of authorities on this point and hold that the officer's actions should be considered
regardless of the controlling criteria. (Resp. Br., p.18.) This Court should reject that argument
because "to hold, as have the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, that standardized criteria are never
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relevant is to ignore the plain language of Bertine, which holds that police discretion to impound
a vehicle is constitutional only ‘so long as that discretion is exercise according to standardized
criteria.’”

Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1249 (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375) (emphasis from

Sanders). Rather, “Bertine makes the existence of standardized criteria the touchstone of the
inquiry into whether an impoundment is lawful,” though in doing so, it “did not purport to
overrule Opperman, and Opperman envisioned a situation in which an impoundment is
immediately necessary, regardless of any other circumstances, in order to facilitate the flow of
traffic or to protect the public form immediate harm.” Id. at 1248-49. Thus, the majority rule
better adheres to the controlling United States Supreme Court precedent by “recognizing the
centrality of standardized criteria, yet allowing broader officer discretion to promote public
safety.” Id. at 1249.
Moreover, the majority view is, in fact, already reflected in Idaho’s precedent on this
subject. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 291 (1995); Owen, 143 Idaho at 278; accord State v.
Reimer, 127 Idaho 214, 218 (1995) (explaining that, while officers have discretion in conducting
inventory searches, the standardized criteria guiding that discretion is still central to the
evaluation of those searches because those standards ensure the exercise of discretion does not
divorce the exception from its historical rationales);. As such, this Court should reject the State’s
call for it to depart from Idaho’s precedent, which it has not shown to be unjust, unwise, or
otherwise improper, and adopt a minority view that is, itself, inconsistent with the applicable
United States Supreme Court precedent.
Finally, the State contends that impoundment was reasonable to protect the public from
the risk of damage or theft, and to protect the police department from a corresponding claim of
liability. (Resp. Br., pp.20-21.) That argument is specious, since impoundment is only allowed
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for “vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience.” Opperman, 428
U.S. at 369. The justifications for impounding a car are simply where it is parked in such a
manner that it, in and of itself, is posing a hazard or inconvenience to the motoring public. Id.;
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369; cf. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 868 (2011) (discussing the
common-sense principle relating to this sort of list of applicable scenarios – noscitur a sociis, a
word is known by the company it keeps).
The concerns about claims of liability for theft relate to the ensuing inventory search,
which was “developed in response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owners property
while it remains in police custody; the protection of the police against claims over lost or stolen
property; and the protection of the police from potential danger.” Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373
(1987). In other words, one of the justifications for inventorying a car after deciding to impound
it is to prevent specious claims that the officers stole something valuable out of the car. Id. at
373 n.2. Thus, the potential for claims of liability for stolen or damaged property within the car
only justifies the intrusion into the car once it is taken into police custody; it does not justify the
initial decisions to take it into police custody. A car properly parked in a parking lot, particularly
one for which the driver has already paid for the privilege of parking it, does not pose the hazard
to the motoring public sufficient to justify the initial decision to warrantlessly seize the car.
Besides, there was no evidence presented that the truck in question was at any more risk
to theft or damage than any other car left in that hotel parking lot. There was, for example, no
evidence that this was a high crime area. Compare Stewart, 152 Idaho at 871 (specifically noting
the testimony that the car in that case was going to be left at a gas station which was in a high
crime area). As such, what the State is really asking for is a rule that allows an officer to
impound any car in a hotel parking lot based on the mere speculation that someone could
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potentially vandalize it.

Thus, adopting the State’s position would completely sever the

impoundment exception form the rationales which keep it moored to the Fourth Amendment’s
principles. As the Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, such arguments are untenable. Lee,
162 Idaho at 651.

Therefore, this Court should reject the State’s attempt to expand the

impoundment exception to the extent that it would swallow the rule prohibiting warrantless
seizures.
The State tries to avoid this problem with its argument by pointing out that Mr. Allen’s
reservation at the hotel, and thus, his privilege to park his truck in that parking lot, would expire,
at which point the officers would have potentially been more justified to impound the truck.
(Resp. Br., p.21.) That argument is also meritless because it is asking this Court to consider what
the officers might have otherwise lawfully done had they not actually violated the Constitution,
and the Idaho Supreme Court has made it eminently clear that the appellate courts do not
consider such hypothetical analyses. Downing, 163 Idaho at 31. In this case, the officers
actually impounded the truck while it was lawfully parked in a place where Mr. Allen had paid
for the privilege to park it. Neither of the rationales identified in Opperman were actually served
by impounding this truck in that particular set of circumstances.
The evidence Mr. Allen presented showed it was more likely true than not that the unfiled
motion to suppress would have been successful because the decision to impound the car was not
conducted pursuant to objectively-reasonable standardized criteria, it did not serve either of the
historical rationales which justify such seizures, and he had standing to challenge that
warrantless seizure. As such, the district court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction
relief, since Mr. Allen met his burden to show his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing that
motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Allen respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order dismissing
his petition for post-conviction relief
DATED this 17th day of April, 2019.
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